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Financial Stability, Monetary Policy, Banking Supervision, and Central Banking

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  • Martin F. Hellwig

    (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods)

Abstract

The paper gives an overview over issues concerning the role of financial stability in monetary policy and the relation between banking supervision and central banking. Following a brief account of developments in the European Monetary Union since its creation, the systematic treatment contains four parts, first a systematic discussion of how a central bank’s operations differ from those of an administrative authority; second, a discussion of how the shift from convertible currencies to paper currencies has affected our understanding of monetary policy and the role of financial stability; third, a discussion of moral hazard in banking and banking supervision as a threat to monetary dominance and to the effective independence of central bank decision making in an environment in which financial stability is an essential precondition for reaching the central bank’s macroeconomic objective, e.g. price stability; finally, a discussion of the challenges for institution design and policy, with special attention to developments in the euro area.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin F. Hellwig, 2014. "Financial Stability, Monetary Policy, Banking Supervision, and Central Banking," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2014_09, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    • Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2014_09
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    Cited by:

    1. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2017. "Twin Peaks And Central Banks: Economics, Political Economy And Comparative Analysis," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1768, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    2. Emmanuel C. Mamatzakis & Mike G. Tsionas, 2021. "A Bayesian panel stochastic volatility measure of financial stability," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(4), pages 5363-5384, October.
    3. Krug, Sebastian, 2018. "The interaction between monetary and macroprudential policy: Should central banks 'lean against the wind' to foster macro-financial stability?," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 12, pages 1-69.
    4. Oleksiy Kryvtsov & Miguel Molico & Ben Tomlin, 2015. "On the Nexus of Monetary Policy and Financial Stability: Recent Developments and Research," Discussion Papers 15-7, Bank of Canada.
    5. Emilios Avgouleas, 2015. "Bank Leverage Ratios and Financial Stability: A Micro- and Macroprudential Perspective," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_849, Levy Economics Institute.
    6. Ernest Gnan & Claudia Kwapil & Maria Teresa Valderrama, 2018. "Monetary policy after the crisis: mandates, targets, and international linkages," Monetary Policy & the Economy, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue Q2/18, pages 8-33.
    7. Prachi Mishra & Ariell Reshef, 2019. "How Do Central Bank Governors Matter? Regulation and the Financial Sector," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(2-3), pages 369-402, March.
    8. Peter Spahn, 2016. "Central Bank Design in a Non-optimal Currency Union A Lender of Last Resort for Government Debt?," ROME Working Papers 201610, ROME Network.
    9. Steffen, Sascha, 2014. "Robustness, validity, and significance of the ECB's asset quality review and stress test exercise," SAFE White Paper Series 23, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    10. Achim Wambach & Ines Läufer, 2015. "Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion: Lernen aus der Krise," Otto-Wolff-Institut Discussion Paper Series 02/2015, Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung, Köln, Deutschland.
    11. Leon Wansleben, 2021. "Divisions of regulatory labor, institutional closure, and structural secrecy in new regulatory states: The case of neglected liquidity risks in market‐based banking," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(3), pages 909-932, July.
    12. Diessner, Sebastian & Lisi, Giulio, 2019. "Masters of the ‘masters of the universe’? Monetary, fiscal and financial dominance in the Eurozone," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 100754, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    13. Martin Hellwig, 2019. "Banks, Politics and European Monetary Union," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2019_13, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    14. Braun, Benjamin, 2016. "Speaking to the people? Money, trust, and central bank legitimacy in the age of quantitative easing," MPIfG Discussion Paper 16/12, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    15. José Américo Pereira Antunes, 2021. "To supervise or to self-supervise: a machine learning based comparison on credit supervision," Financial Innovation, Springer;Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, vol. 7(1), pages 1-21, December.
    16. Krug, Sebastian, 2015. "The interaction between monetary and macroprudential policy: Should central banks "lean against the wind" to foster macrofinancial stability?," Economics Working Papers 2015-08, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
    17. Winkler Adalbert, 2015. "The ECB as Lender of Last Resort: Banks versus Governments," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 235(3), pages 329-341, June.
    18. Martin F. Hellwig, 2014. "Yes Virginia, There is a European Banking Union! But It May Not Make Your Wishes Come True," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2014_12, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    19. Sascha Steffen & Lea Steinruecke, 2015. "Funktionsweise und Einschätzung des Comprehensive Assessment," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 67(4), pages 418-443, December.
    20. Theo Kiriazidis, 2016. "National State Aid within the Banking Union (BU) and the Hard Core: Periphery Financial Divide," Journal of Applied Finance & Banking, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 6(5), pages 1-4.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banking Supervision; financial stability; monetary policy; central banking; bank resolution; independence of central banks and supervisory authorities;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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