The Political Economy of Agricultural Protection: Sweden 1887
AbstractWe analyse the Swedish general elections that took place in spring and autumn 1887. Our aim is to discover which groups of voters were responsible for the severe losses that the supporters of free trade suffered in the second of these contests, and that allowed the protectionists to gain the majority in parliament and to initiate a new tariff policy. We find that while capital owners and wage earners consistently favoured free trade, in the spring election only the largest farmers supported protectionism. By autumn, political preferences among smallholders and middling farmers had shifted in favour of protectionism, too. As these groups were not specialised in the production of import competing goods, we assume that the political landslide in the autumn elections can be attributed to the influence of anti-free trade propaganda.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods in its series Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods with number 2010_08.
Date of creation: Mar 2010
Date of revision:
voting; election analysis; tariffs; trade policies;
Other versions of this item:
- Lehmann, Sibylle & Volckart, Oliver, 2011. "The political economy of agricultural protection: Sweden 1887," European Review of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(01), pages 29-59, April.
- N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913
- N53 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - Europe: Pre-1913
- N73 - Economic History - - Economic History: Transport, International and Domestic Trade, Energy, and Other Services - - - Europe: Pre-1913
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2010-03-28 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2010-03-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-HIS-2010-03-28 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-POL-2010-03-28 (Positive Political Economics)
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