The Effect of Tax Credit on Politically Distorted Allocations: A Theoretical Approach
Abstract
Many countries have adopted policies to give preferential treatment for voluntary contributions to certain public goods. Taxable deductions, matching subsidies and rebate subsidies, which decrease gthe price of givingh for donors, are prototypical examples. However, the more aggressive policy of tax credit for voluntary contributions to certain public goods which decreases gthe price of givingh to zero, has not been studied so far in detail, although such a policy can be seen in several countries: the Percentage Law in Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, and the Hometown Tax-payment policy in Japan. In these countries, and especially in Eastern European countries, such a policy is justified because, by decentralizing the power of government, it allows individuals to reveal their gtrueh preferences and thus allows necessary adjustment for distorted government allocations. In this paper, I find that, such a policy has this adjustment effect if, and only if, the size of the tax credit exceeds certain threshold. In other words, such a policy can be totally cancelled out by a lobby-government coalition if its size falls beneath a threshold.Download Info
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Paper provided by Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan in its series Discussion papers with number ron234.Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: May 2012
Date of revision: Jun 2012
Handle: RePEc:mof:wpaper:ron234
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Related research
Keywords: Public Good; Tax Credit; Lobbying; Decentralization;Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- L30 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - General
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-06-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2012-06-25 (Public Economics)
- NEP-TRA-2012-06-25 (Transition Economics)
References
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- John List & David Reiley, 2008.
"Field experiments,"
Artefactual Field Experiments
00091, The Field Experiments Website.
- Glenn W. Harrison & John A. List, 2004. "Field Experiments," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(4), pages 1009-1055, December.
- Glenn Harrison & John List, 2004. "Field experiments," Artefactual Field Experiments 00058, The Field Experiments Website.
- Clotfelter, Charles T., 1985. "Federal Tax Policy and Charitable Giving," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226110486, Septiembr.
- Charles T. Clotfelter, 1985. "Federal Tax Policy and Charitable Giving," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number clot85-1, October.
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