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Assigning an unpleasant task without payment

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  • Goldlücke, Susanne
  • Tröger, Thomas

Abstract

How should a group of people decide to allocate a task that has to be done but is not adequately rewarded? This paper finds an optimal mechanism for the private provision of a public service in an environment without monetary transfers. All members of the group have the same cost of providing the service, but some individuals are better suited for the task than others. The optimal mechanism is a threshold rule that assigns the task randomly among volunteers if enough volunteers come forward, and otherwise assigns the task among the non-volunteers.

Suggested Citation

  • Goldlücke, Susanne & Tröger, Thomas, 2018. "Assigning an unpleasant task without payment," Working Papers 18-02, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:mnh:wpaper:44076
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rosenthal, Howard, 1984. "Participation and the provision of discrete public goods: a strategic analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 171-193, July.
    2. Bilodeau, Marc & Slivinski, Al, 1996. "Toilet cleaning and department chairing: Volunteering a public service," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 299-308, February.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Volunteering ; public good provision ; mechanism design;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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