The Constitutional Treaty of the EU and the institutional framework
AbstractThe so-called Constitutional Treaty (CT) of the EU, currently in the middle of the ratification process, is seen by its advocates as a major step for the advancement of European integration, conciliating simultaneously a democratic deepening, a more efficient decision- making process in the EU, and a clearer definition of the aims and founding principles of the EU. Given the successful establishment of the Euro, the EU is facing new challenges in terms of macroeconomic policies. The Treaty tackles this issue. The present paper offers a preliminary assessment of what is achieved and concludes that the new framework represents a limited but clear progress for macroeconomic coordination and integration and offers scope for further changes. It also comments on the implicit version of fiscal federalism present in the Treaty.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano in its series Departmental Working Papers with number 2006-05.
Date of creation: 01 Feb 2006
Date of revision:
EU Constitution; Macroeconomic Policy; Institutional framework;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Russell Cooper & Hubert Kempf, 2003. "Commitment and the Adoption of a Common Currency," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(1), pages 119-142, February.
- W.H. Buiter, 1999.
"Alice in Euroland,"
CEP Discussion Papers
dp0423, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Russell Cooper & Hubert Kempf, 2004.
"Overturning Mundell: Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(2), pages 371-396, 04.
- Russell Cooper & Hubert Kempf, 2004. "Overturning Mundell: Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 371-396.
- Russell Cooper & Hubert Kempf, 2002. "Overturning Mundell: fiscal policy in a monetary union," Staff Report 311, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Russell Cooper & Hubert Kempf & Dan Peled, 2004. "Is it is or is it Ain't my Obligation? Regional Debt in Monetary Unions," NBER Working Papers 10239, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Corinne Aaron-Cureau & Hubert Kempf, 2004.
"Bargaining over monetary policy in a monetary union and the case for appointing an independent central banker,"
Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2004
85, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
- Corinne Aaron-Cureau & Hubert Kempf, 2006. "Bargaining over monetary policy in a monetary union and the case for appointing an independent central banker," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(1), pages 1-27, January.
- Antonio Fatás, 1998. "Does EMU need a fiscal federation?," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 13(26), pages 163-203, 04.
- Ping He & Lixin Huang & Randall Wright, 2005. "Money And Banking In Search Equilibrium," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(2), pages 637-670, 05.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (DEMM Working Papers).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.