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Unkonventionelle Geldpolitik: Warum die Europäische Zentralbank ihre Unabhängigkeit nicht verloren hat


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  • Schwäbe, Carsten
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    Die Banken- und Staatsschuldenkrise im Euroraum deckte wesentliche Strukturdefizite der Europäischen Währungsunion (EWU) auf und stellt nationale wie europäische Entscheidungsträger vor nie dagewesene, unvorhergesehene Herausforderungen. In diesem unsicheren Rahmen agiert ebenfalls die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB), die vor allem kurzfristig die Reaktion auf die Krise aktiv mitbestimmte und unterstützte. Sie flankierte die Reaktionen der europäischen Politik mit einem umfassenden Paket unkonventioneller geldpolitischer Maßnahmen wie dem Ankauf von Anleihen der von Schuldenkrisen betroffenen Eurostaaten. Der vorliegende Beitrag argumentiert, dass vor dem Hintergrund der unkonventionellen Geldpolitik bisher nicht von einem Verlust der Unabhängigkeit der EZB gesprochen werden kann. Die krisenbedingte Annäherung an die Politik sowie die Ausdehnung ihres geldpolitischen Instrumentariums an die Grenzen der Europäischen Verträge stellen eine mit Risiken verbundene, aber dennoch notwendige Reaktion der EZB auf die Krise dar, obgleich dadurch nur eine kurzfristige Stabilisierung, nicht aber die Beseitigung der Strukturdefizite der EWU erreicht werden kann. -- The banking and souvereign-debt crisis in the eurozone uncovered substantial structural deficits of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and represent unheard-of and unforeseen chal-lenges for the national and European decision makers. In this unstable atmosphere the European Central Bank (ECB) has to operate, too. It supported the political reaction on the crisis by carrying out especially short-term policies such as the purchase of governmental bonds of states concerned by the debt crisis. This article argues that referring to the unconventional monetary policy a loss of independence of the ECB cannot yet be identified. The convergence between the monetary and the fiscal authority due to the crisis as well as the extension of its monetary apparatus to the legal limit of the European Treaties represent a strategy associated with risks, but nevertheless a necessary reaction of the ECB, although in this way only a short-term stabilization and not a disposal of the structural deficits of the EMU can be achieved.

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    Paper provided by University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW) in its series CIW Discussion Papers with number 3/2013.

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    Date of creation: 2013
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:ciwdps:32013

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    Keywords: Zentralbanken; Unabhängigkeit; Finanzkrise; Währungsunion; central bank independence; financial crisis; monetary union;

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