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Exports, Jobs, Growth! Congressional Hearings on US Trade Agreements

Author

Listed:
  • Jieun Lee

    (University of Michigan)

  • Iain Osgood

    (University of Michigan)

Abstract

Who testifies on US trade agreements before Congress and what do they say? We examine the content of Congressional testimony on US trade agreements, and the selection process which determines who testifies in the first place. We find that testimony is systematically tilted towards a sunny view of tradeÕs positive economic effects, while import competition and offshoring are generally downplayed. We argue that tradeÕs supporters strategically frame their motives for supporting trade agreements, and that pro-trade committee chairsÕ decisions on who testifies further skew testimony away from the distributive consequences of globalization within the United States. Congressional hearings on trade agreements therefore represent a key site where the influence of dominant pro-trade interests is both revealed and reinforced.

Suggested Citation

  • Jieun Lee & Iain Osgood, 2018. "Exports, Jobs, Growth! Congressional Hearings on US Trade Agreements," Working Papers 667, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
    • Handle: RePEc:mie:wpaper:667
    as

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    File URL: http://www.fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/workingpapers/Papers651-675/r667.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Congress; trade agreements; Congressional hearings; globalization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F50 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - General
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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