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The Micro-foundations of Social Contracts, Civil Conflicts and International Peace-Making Abstract: This paper explores the micro-foundations of conflict generation and persistence within the traditional greed and grievance non-cooperative set up between a government and a rebel group. We expand the traditional model in various ways. First, we allow for the reaction curves of both parties in non-cooperative games to be substitutes and not inevitably complementary, so a peaceful strategy from a group may be followed by a belligerent upsurge from the other. Second, we also allow for diasporas’ transfers to rebel groups, thus generating a trade-off between the gains associated with peace and war among rebels. Third, we expand external aid in the form of fungible financing of government transfers ‘buying’ peace by allowing for mechanisms that induce behavioural change towards peace in a cooperative model of principal-agent well-intended (Nordic-like) donors. These extensions provide a better understanding of conflict persistence, the consequences of competing international aid and why sub-optimal sanctions provision (‘cheap talk’) by the international community are frequent

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Author Info
Jose Cuesta () (Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D.C.)
Mansoob Murshed () (Institute of Social Studies, The Hague)

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File URL: http://www.microconflict.eu/publications/RWP8_JC_MM.pdf
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File Function: First version, 2008
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Paper provided by MICROCON - A Micro Level Analysis of Violent Conflict in its series Research Working Papers with number 8.

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Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:mcn:rwpapr:8

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Related research
Keywords: Civil war; Social Contract; Aid for Peace;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information

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  1. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Murshed, S. Mansoob & Verwimp, Philip, 2008. "Enforcing Peace Agreements through Commitment Technologies," Working Papers RP2008/45, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER). [Downloadable!]
  3. Edward Miguel & Shanker Satyanath & Ernest Sergenti, 2004. "Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(4), pages 725-753, August.
  4. Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke, 1998. "On Economic Causes of Civil War," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(4), pages 563-73, October.
  5. Azam, Jean-Paul & Mesnard, Alice, 2001. "Civil War and the Social Contract," IDEI Working Papers 124, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  6. Patricia Justino, 2006. "On the Links between Violent Conflict and Chronic Poverty: How Much Do We Really Know?," HiCN Working Papers 18, Households in Conflict Network. [Downloadable!]
  7. Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, 2004. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," Development and Comp Systems 0409007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Christa N. Brunnschweiler & Erwin H. Bulte, 2009. "Natural resources and violent conflict: resource abundance, dependence, and the onset of civil wars," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(4), pages 651-674, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Xavier Sala-I-Martin & Gernot Doppelhofer & Ronald I. Miller, 2004. "Determinants of Long-Term Growth: A Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 813-835, September. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Azam, J.P., 2001. "The Redistributive State and Conflicts in Africa," Working Papers Series 2001-3, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
  11. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson & Thierry Verdier, 2003. "Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule," NBER Working Papers 10136, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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