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Household Expectations and Dissent Among Policymakers

Author

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  • Moritz Grebe

    (University of Giessen)

  • Peter Tillmann

    (University of Giessen)

Abstract

This paper studies the impact of dissent in the ECB's Governing Council on uncertainty surrounding households' inflation expectations. We conduct a randomized controlled trial using the Bundesbank Online Panel Households. Participants are provided with alternative information treatments concerning the vote in the Council, e.g. unanimity and dissent, and are asked to submit probabilistic inflation expectations. The results show that the vote is informative. Households revise their subjective inflation forecast after receiving information about the vote. Dissenting votes cause a wider individual distribution of future inflation. Hence, dissent increases households' uncertainty about inflation. This effect is statistically significant once we allow for the interaction between the treatments and individual characteristics of respondents. The results are robust with respect to alternative measures of forecast uncertainty and hold for different model specifications. Our findings suggest that providing information about dissenting votes without additional information about the nature of dissent is detrimental to coordinating household expectations.

Suggested Citation

  • Moritz Grebe & Peter Tillmann, 2022. "Household Expectations and Dissent Among Policymakers," MAGKS Papers on Economics 202226, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    • Handle: RePEc:mar:magkse:202226
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    File URL: https://www.uni-marburg.de/en/fb02/research-groups/economics/macroeconomics/research/magks-joint-discussion-papers-in-economics/papers/2022-papers/26-2022_grebe.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Ehrmann, Michael & Gnan, Phillipp & Rieder, Kilian, 2023. "Central Bank Communication by ??? The Economics of Public Policy Leaks," CEPR Discussion Papers 18152, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    central bank communication; disagreement; inflation expectations; randomized controlled trial; survey;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles

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