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The Bureaucracy Trap

Author

Listed:
  • Ascensión Andina-Díaz

    (Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Universidad de Málaga.)

  • Francesco Feri

    (Department of Economics, Royal Holloway, University of London.)

  • Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez

    (Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Universidad de Málaga.)

Abstract

In a recent paper, Andina-D´?az et al. (2021) show that in a context of dynamic elections, rigid institutions induce political parties to push policies as far as the political system allows, whereas more flexible institutions can foster moderate alternation. We build on this paper to study the incentive of an elected government to reduce bureaucratic inefficiencies and increase institutional flexibility. We show that high levels of bureaucratic inefficiencies are very likely to persist over time, leading to a bureaucracy trap. Moreover, we find that regardless of the initial levels of bureaucratic inefficiencies, traditional long-life parties may have no incentive to undertake such a reform. This result provides a new argument to explain why bureaucratic inefficiencies persist in some countries over time

Suggested Citation

  • Ascensión Andina-Díaz & Francesco Feri & Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez, 2022. "The Bureaucracy Trap," Working Papers 2022-03, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
    • Handle: RePEc:mal:wpaper:2022-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Philippe Aghion & Yann Algan & Pierre Cahuc & Andrei Shleifer, 2010. "Regulation and Distrust," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(3), pages 1015-1049.
    2. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "The Rise of the Regulatory State," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(2), pages 401-425, June.
    3. Abhijit V. Banerjee, 1997. "A Theory of Misgovernance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1289-1332.
    4. Andina-Díaz, Ascensión & Feri, Francesco & Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A., 2021. "Institutional flexibility, political alternation, and middle-of-the-road policies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    5. Gabriele Gratton & Luigi Guiso & Claudio Michelacci & Massimo Morelli, 2021. "From Weber to Kafka: Political Instability and the Overproduction of Laws," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(9), pages 2964-3003, September.
    6. Paolo Pinotti, 2012. "Trust, Regulation and Market Failures," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 94(3), pages 650-658, August.
    7. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/4km7l02j139aj8hl7kcccmqk9s is not listed on IDEAS
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    MGradual policy implementation; political alternation; institutional reform; bureaucratic trap.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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