The Global Fight against Child Trafficking: How Can It Be Won ?
AbstractWe study how countries can coordinate their national action plans so as to fight global child trafficking. As both the demand and supply of trafficked children are transboundary in scope, international cooperation may be necessary to mitigate cross-country externalities. We show that specialization is the main feature of international cooperation. We also show that the pattern of specialization depends only on the level of economic development of state-parties. In particular, specialization leads to asymmetric national action plans when state-parties have different levels of economic development: the governments of poorer countries specialize on fighting the supply of trafficked children from their territories, while the governments of richer countries specialize on fighting the demand arising within their territories.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CIRPEE in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 1213.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Child trafficking; externalities; international cooperation; cooperative equilibrium;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
- J47 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Coercive Labor Markets
- O19 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-03-28 (All new papers)
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