A Dynamic Model of Risk-Shifting Incentives with Convertible Debt
AbstractIn a one-period setting Green (1984) demonstrates that convertible debt perfectly mitigates the asset substitution problem by curbing shareholders’ incentive to increase risk. This is because claimholders design the capital structure precisely when the risk-shifting opportunity is available. In practice, firms do not alter their capital structure over the life of the convertible debt. Hence, when the risk-shifting opportunity arises, convertible debt design may no longer match with firm asset value to mitigate the asset substitution problem. This leaves room for a strategic non-cooperative game between shareholders and convertible debtholders. We show that two risk-shifting scenarios arise as attainable Nash equilibria. Pure asset substitution occurs when, despite convertible debtholders not exercising their conversion option, shareholders still find it profitable to shift risk. Strategic conversion occurs when, despite convertible debtholders giving up the conversion option value, they are better off receiving their share of the wealth expropriation from straight debtholders. We use contingent claims analysis and the Black and Scholes (1973) setup to characterize the equilibria. Even when initial convertibles debt is endogenously designed so as to minimize the likelihood of risk-shifting equilibria, we show that asset substitution cannot be completely eliminated. Our overall conclusion is that – in contrast to agency theory’s claim – convertible debt is an imperfect instrument for mitigating shareholders’ incentive to increase risk.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CIRPEE in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 0930.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Convertible debt; risk-shifting; non-cooperative game;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Timo P. Korkeamaki & William T. Moore, 2004. "Convertible Bond Design and Capital Investment: The Role of Call Provisions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(1), pages 391-405, 02.
- Asquith, Paul & Mullins, David W, Jr, 1991. " Convertible Debt: Corporate Call Policy and Voluntary Conversion," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(4), pages 1273-89, September.
- Stein, Jeremy C., 1992.
"Convertible bonds as backdoor equity financing,"
Journal of Financial Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 3-21, August.
- Galai, Dan & Masulis, Ronald W., 1976. "The option pricing model and the risk factor of stock," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1-2), pages 53-81.
- Ingersoll, Jonathan E, Jr, 1977. "An Examination of Corporate Call Policies on Convertible Securities," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 463-78, May.
- Øivind Anti Nilsen & Fabio Schiantarelli, 2003.
"Zeros and Lumps in Investment: Empirical Evidence on Irreversibilities and Nonconvexities,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics,
MIT Press, vol. 85(4), pages 1021-1037, November.
- Oivind Anti Nilsen & Fabio Schiantarelli, 1996. "Zeroes and Lumps in Investment: Empirical Evidence on Irreversibilities and Non-Convexities," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 337., Boston College Department of Economics, revised 01 Nov 2000.
- Mark Doms & Timothy Dunne, 1994.
"Capital Adjustment Patterns in Manufacturing Plants,"
94-11, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
- Mark E. Doms & Timothy Dunne, 1998. "Capital Adjustment Patterns in Manufacturing Plants," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(2), pages 409-429, April.
- Grenadier, Steven R, 1996. " The Strategic Exercise of Options: Development Cascades and Overbuilding in Real Estate Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(5), pages 1653-79, December.
- Craig M. Lewis & Richard J. Rogalski & James K. Seward, 1999. "Is Convertible Debt a Substitute for Straight Debt or for Common Equity?," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 28(3), Fall.
- Mayers, David, 1998. "Why firms issue convertible bonds: the matching of financial and real investment options," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 83-102, January.
- Emanuel, David C., 1983. "Warrant valuation and exercise strategy," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 211-235, August.
- Chang, Shao-Chi & Chen, Sheng-Syan & Liu, Yichen, 2004. "Why firms use convertibles: A further test of the sequential-financing hypothesis," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(5), pages 1163-1183, May.
- Gavish, Bezalel & Kalay, Avner, 1983. "On the Asset Substitution Problem," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(01), pages 21-30, March.
- Constantinides, George M. & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1984. "Strategic analysis of the competitive exercise of certain financial options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 128-138, February.
- Green, Richard C., 1984. "Investment incentives, debt, and warrants," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 115-136, March.
- Wolfgang Bühler & Christian Koziol, 2002. "Valuation Of Convertible Bonds With Sequential Conversion," Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), LMU Munich School of Management, vol. 54(4), pages 302-334, October.
- Constantinides, George M., 1984. "Warrant exercise and bond conversion in competitive markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 371-397, September.
- Black, Fischer & Scholes, Myron S, 1973. "The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 637-54, May-June.
- Lewis, Craig M. & Rogalski, Richard J. & Seward, James K., 1998. "Agency Problems, Information Asymmetries, and Convertible Debt Security Design," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 32-59, January.
- Nalin Kulatilaka & Enrico C. Perotti, 1998. "Strategic Growth Options," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(8), pages 1021-1031, August.
- Spatt, Chester S & Sterbenz, Frederic P, 1993. " Incentive Conflicts, Bundling Claims, and the Interaction among Financial Claimants," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(2), pages 513-28, June.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Johanne Perron).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.