Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Does Transparency Reduce Corruption ?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Octavian Strimbu
  • Patrick Gonzalez

Abstract

Does a better monitoring (transparency) of officials lowers the incidence of corruption ? Using a common agency game with imperfect information, we show that the answer depends on the measure of corruption that one uses. More transparency lowers the prevalence of corruption but it may raise the average bribe as it motivates the corruptor to bid more aggressively for the agent’s favour. We show that transparency affects the prevalence of corruption at the margin through a competitive effect and an efficiency effect.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: https://www.create.ulaval.ca/sites/create.ulaval.ca/files/Publications/create2013-5.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CREATE in its series Cahiers de recherche CREATE with number 2013-5.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:lvl:creacr:2013-5

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Faculté des sciences de l'agriculture et de l'alimentation, Pavillon Paul-Comtois, 2425 rue de l'Agriculture, local 4424, Québec, Qc, G1V 0A6
Phone: 418-656-2131 poste 5098
Fax: 418-656-7821
Email:
Web page: http://www.create.ulaval.ca
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Corruption; Transparency; Common Agency;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
  2. Le Breton, Michel & Salanie, Francois, 2003. "Lobbying under political uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2589-2610, December.
  3. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1995. "Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(428), pages 145-59, January.
  4. Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
  5. Toke S. Aidt, 2003. "Economic analysis of corruption: a survey," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(491), pages F632-F652, November.
  6. David Martimort & Aggey Semenov, 2007. "Political Biases in Lobbying under Asymmetric Information," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(2-3), pages 614-623, 04-05.
  7. Harstad, Bård & Svensson, Jakob, 2006. "Bribes, Lobbying and Development," CEPR Discussion Papers 5759, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lvl:creacr:2013-5. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Johanne Perron).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.