Wages and Employment in a Repeated Game with Revenue Fluctuations
AbstractThis paper analyses wages and employment in a repeated game between a union and a firm. The parties cannot enter a binding contract, and revenue is fluctuating. It is shown that if discount factors are moderate, then the best sequence of wage rates and employments sustainable in a subgame perfect equilibrium and sharing the surplus in fixed proportions, has a more counter cyclical wage rate than the one sharing the surplus in the same proportions in each period. This result holds true whether the revenue shocks are i.i.d. or follows a Markov process with persistence.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 95-01.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Jan 1995
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in: European Economic Review, 1997, 41(1) pp 147-62
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Other versions of this item:
- Schultz, Christian, 1997. "Wages and employment in a repeated game with revenue fluctuations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 147-162, January.
- E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution
- E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
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