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Tax Salience, Voting, and Deliberation

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Author Info
Rupert Sausgruber (University of Innsbruck)
Jean-Robert Tyran (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen)

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Abstract

Tax incentives can be more or less salient, i.e. noticeable or cognitively easy to process. Our hypothesis is that taxes on consumers are more salient to consumers than equivalent taxes on sellers because consumers underestimate the extent of tax shifting in the market. We show that tax salience biases consumers’ voting on tax regimes, and that experience is an effective de-biasing mechanism in the experimental laboratory. Pre-vote deliberation makes initially held opinions more extreme rather than correct and does not eliminate the bias in the typical committee. Yet, if voters can discuss their experience with the tax regimes they are less likely to be biased.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 08-21.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0821

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Related research
Keywords: tax salience; learning; deliberation; voting;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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References listed on IDEAS
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