Theoretically robust but empirically invalid? An experimental investigation into tax equivalence
Abstract
The idea that the final distribution of the tax burden (economic incidence) does not depend on the initial distribution of tax liabilities (statutory incidence) is referred to as the Liability Side Equivalence principle. This paper tests this principle in the laboratory and finds that subjects who actually have to pay the tax carry a higher tax burden. It is argued that this violation of Liability Side Equivalence is due to the fact that a change in the distribution of tax liabilities induces a shift in behaviorally relevant social norms. This shift, in turn, affects the impact of the tax. Our results explain some striking empirical observations and have important theoretical and practical implications.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 16 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 719-734
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
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Related research
Keywords: Tax equivalence; Tax incidence; Social norms.;Other versions of this item:
- Rudolf KERSCHBAMER & Georg KIRCHSTEIGER, 1997. "Theoretically Robust But Empirically Invalid? An Experimental Investigation into Tax Equivalence," Vienna Economics Papers vie9704, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Georg Kirchsteiger & Rudolf Kerschbamer, 2000. "Theoretically robust but empirically invalid: an experimental investigation into tax equivalence," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/5903, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence
- H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Jean-Robert Tyran & Arno Riedl, 2003.
"Tax Liability Side Equivalence in Gift-Exchange Labor Markets,"
University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2003
2003-15, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
- Riedl, Arno & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2005. "Tax liability side equivalence in gift-exchange labor markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(11-12), pages 2369-2382, December.
- Riedl, Arno & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2005. "Tax liability side equivalence in gift-exchange labor markets," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-16452, Maastricht University.
- Arno Riedl & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2003. "Tax Liability Side Equivalence in Gift-Exchange Labor Markets," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-065/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Rupert Sausgruber & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2008.
"Tax Salience, Voting, and Deliberation,"
Working Papers
2009-25, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
- Rupert Sausgruber & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2008. "Tax Salience, Voting, and Deliberation," Discussion Papers 08-21, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Rupert Sausgruber & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2009. "Tax Salience, Voting, and Deliberation," NRN working papers 2009-25, The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
- Blumkin, Tomer & Ruffle, Bradley J. & Ganun, Yosef, 2012.
"Are income and consumption taxes ever really equivalent? Evidence from a real-effort experiment with real goods,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 56(6), pages 1200-1219.
- Tomer Blumkin & Bradley J. Ruffle & Yosef Ganun, 2008. "Are Income and Consumption Taxes Ever Really Equivalent? Evidence from a Real-Effort Experiment with Real Goods," Working Papers 0801, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Tomer Blumkin & Bradley J. Ruffle & Yosef Ganun, 2008. "Are Income and Consumption Taxes ever really Equivalent? Evidence from a Real-Effort Experiment with Real Goods," CESifo Working Paper Series 2194, CESifo Group Munich.
- Blumkin, Tomer & Ruffle, Bradley J. & Ganun, Yosef, 2007. "Are Income and Consumption Taxes Ever Really Equivalent? Evidence from a Real-Effort Experiment with Real Goods," MPRA Paper 6479, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Blumkin, Tomer & Ruffle, Bradley & Ganun, Yosef, 2010. "Are Income and Consumption Taxes Ever Really Equivalent? Evidence from a Real-Effort Experiment with Real Goods," IZA Discussion Papers 5145, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Casoria Fortuna & Riedl Arno, 2012.
"Experimental labor markets and policy considerations: Incomplete contracts and macroeconomic aspects,"
Research Memoranda
058, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
- Casoria, Fortuna & Riedl, Arno, 2012. "Experimental Labor Markets and Policy Considerations: Incomplete Contracts and Macroeconomic Aspects," IZA Discussion Papers 7102, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian & Müller, Wieland, 2010.
"Taxation and market power,"
Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism"
SP II 2010-07, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Konrad, K.A. & Morath, F. & Müller, W., 2010. "Taxation and Market Power," Discussion Paper 2010-03, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath & Wieland Müller, 2009. "Taxation and Market Power," CESifo Working Paper Series 2880, CESifo Group Munich.
- Ruffle, Bradley J., 2005. "Tax and subsidy incidence equivalence theories: experimental evidence from competitive markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(8), pages 1519-1542, August.
- Raj Chetty & Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, 2009.
"Salience and taxation: theory and evidence,"
Finance and Economics Discussion Series
2009-11, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Raj Chetty & Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, 2009. "Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1145-77, September.
- Raj Chetty & Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, 2007. "Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 13330, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sausgruber, Rupert & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2011. "Are we taxing ourselves?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 164-176.
- Arno Riedl & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2003. "Tax Liability Side Equivalence in Gift-Exchange Labor Markets," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-065/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Raj Chetty, 2009. "The Simple Economics of Salience and Taxation," NBER Working Papers 15246, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Arno Riedl, 2009. "Behavioral and Experimental Economics Can Inform Public Policy: Some Thoughts," CESifo Working Paper Series 2902, CESifo Group Munich.
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