Arbeitsmarktinstrumente und gesellschaftliche Normen - Das Mainzer-Modell untergräbt gesellschaftliche Normen und verschärft damit die Probleme, die es zu überwinden glaubt

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Arbeitsmarktinstrumente und gesellschaftliche Normen - Das Mainzer-Modell untergräbt gesellschaftliche Normen und verschärft damit die Probleme, die es zu überwinden glaubt

Author Info

Steffen J. Roth ()

Abstract

Die Beurteilung arbeitsmarktpolitischer Instrumente alleine aufgrund der Abwägung von fiskalischen Maßnahmekosten und Erträgen greift zu kurz. Allokationseffekte müssen ebenso berücksichtigt werden, wie Fragen der Kompatibilität mit Prinzipien einer das Marktsystem unterstützenden Sozialpolitik. Ein nur selten ausführlich beleuchteter weiterer Aspekt ist die Rückwirkung von institutionellen Regelungen auf die Normen der Gesellschaftsmitglieder. Dieser Gedanke wird in diesem Beitrag anhand des prominentesten deutschen Kombi-Lohns, dem Mainzer Modell, exemplarisch verfolgt. Neben Verstößen gegen sozialpolitische Prinzipien und der Entfaltung von Fehlanreizen droht das Mainzer Modell die immateriellen Arbeitsanreize durch Einstellungsänderungen abzuschwächen. Es verschärft damit aus sich selbst heraus das Problem, welches zu beheben es vorgibt.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung, Köln, Deutschland in its series Otto-Wolff-Institut Discussion Paper Series with number 01/2003.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Mar 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kln:owiwdp:dp_am

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Pohligstr. 1 (Pohlighaus), 50969 K�ln
Phone: 0221/470-5348
Fax: 0221/470-535
Web page: http://www.otto-wolff-institut.de/index.html
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Malte Heesch).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Institutional; Evolutionary

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

George A. Akerlof, 1978. "A theory of social custom, of which unemployment may be one consequence," Special Studies Papers 118, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
Other versions:
- Akerlof, George A, 1980. "A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One Consequence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 94(4), pages 749-75, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Hans-Werner Sinn, 2002. "Die Höhle in der Eiger-Nordwand - Eine Anmerkung zum Mainzer Modell und zum Wohlfahrtsstaat an sich," Ifo Schnelldienst, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 55(03), pages 20-25, 09. [Downloadable!]
Snower, Dennis J., 1994. "The Simple Economics of Benefit Transfers," CEPR Discussion Papers 1086, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Dennis J. Snower, 1995. "The Simple Economics of Benefit Transfers," IMF Working Papers 95/5, International Monetary Fund.
Tversky, Amos & Kahneman, Daniel, 1991. "Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(4), pages 1039-61, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Winkelmann, Liliana & Winkelmann, Rainer, 1998. "Why Are the Unemployed So Unhappy? Evidence from Panel Data," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 65(257), pages 1-15, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Barbara Petrongolo & Christopher A. Pissarides, 2001. "Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 390-431, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Petrongolo, Barbara & Pissarides, Christopher, 2000. "Looking Into The Black Box: A Survey Of The Matching Function," CEPR Discussion Papers 2409, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Barbara Petrongolo & Christopher A. Pissarides, 2000. "Looking Into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function," CEP Discussion Papers dp0470, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
Lindbeck, A. & Nyberg, S., 2001. "Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms and Social Insurance," Research Institute of Industrial Economics Working Papers 557, Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN).
Other versions:
- Lindbeck, Assar & Nyberg, Sten, 2001. "Raising Children To Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms And Social Insurance," Seminar Papers 691, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
- Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg, 2001. "Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms and Social Insurance," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
- Lindbeck, Assar & Nyberg, Sten, 2001. "Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms and Social Insurance," Research Papers in Economics 2001:5, Stockholm University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Lindbeck, Assar & Nyberg, Sten, 2001. "Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms and Social Insurance," Working Paper Series 557, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg, 2006. "Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms, and Social Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 121(4), pages 1473-1503, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Apart from a small start up grant in the 1990's, RePEc has received no funding and lives on the help of volunteers.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-11.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.