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Determinants of In-group Bias: Group Affiliation or Guilt-aversion?

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Author Info
Werner Güth (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena, Germany)
Matteo Ploner (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena, Germany)
Tobias Regner (Friedrich Schiller University, Jena, Germany)

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Abstract

In-group favoritism in social dilemma situations is one of the main findings of studies in Social Identity Theory. We investigate what causes the in-group bias: is it due to mere group affiliation or, alternatively, is guilt-aversion a possible explanation? We induce group membership in a minimal group setting, observe in-/out-group transfers and elicit re- spective beliefs. We ?nd that mere group affiliation affects beliefs and explains a substantial part of the bias, but we also ?nd evidence in favor of guilt-aversion as a source of motivation.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics, Thueringer Universitaets- und Landesbibliothek in its series Jena Economic Research Papers in Economics with number 2008-046.

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Date of creation: 10 Jun 2008
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Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2008-046

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Related research
Keywords: social preferences; experiments; social dilemma; group identity; guilt aversion;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations

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