Determinants of In-group Bias: Group Affiliation or Guilt-aversion?
AbstractIn-group favoritism in social dilemma situations is one of the main findings of studies in Social Identity Theory. We investigate what causes the in-group bias: is it due to mere group affiliation or, alternatively, is guilt-aversion a possible explanation? We induce group membership in a minimal group setting, observe in-/out-group transfers and elicit re- spective beliefs. We ?nd that mere group affiliation affects beliefs and explains a substantial part of the bias, but we also ?nd evidence in favor of guilt-aversion as a source of motivation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2008-046.
Date of creation: 10 Jun 2008
Date of revision:
social preferences; experiments; social dilemma; group identity; guilt aversion;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
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- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
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- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-06-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2008-06-21 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2008-06-21 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2008-06-21 (Game Theory)
- NEP-SOC-2008-06-21 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
- NEP-UPT-2008-06-21 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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