Wage Determination and the Sources of Bargaining Power
AbstractThis paper explores the sources of bargaining power in wage negotiations. In the standard analyses of wage bargaining, the negotiation partners are specified a priori, and thus it is impossible to address the question of how they achieve and retain their negotiating positions, on which their bargaining power is based. In our analysis, by contrast, the firm can choose between two sets of wage negotiations: those it can conduct with its incumbent employees and those with new job seekers. These negotiations are imperfectly substitutable, and the degree of substitutability is determined by the firm’s labor turnover costs (e.g. costs of hiring, training, and firing). In this context, labor turnover costs not only influence the negotiators’ alternative to bargaining (i.e. their fall-back positions and outside options); they affect the nature of the bargaining process itself. This approach leads to a new theory of wage determination.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 535.
Length: 72 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2002
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- J32 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
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- Stenbacka, Rune & Tombak, Mihkel, 2012. "Make and buy: Balancing bargaining power," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 391-402.
- Alfonso Arpaia & Karl Pichelmann, 2007.
"Nominal and real wage flexibility in EMU,"
International Economics and Economic Policy,
Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 299-328, November.
- Arpaia, Alfonso & Pichelmann, Karl, 2007. "Nominal and real wage flexibility in EMU," MPRA Paper 4364, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Alfonso Arpaia & Karl Pichelmann, 2007. "Nominal and real wage flexibility in EMU," European Economy - Economic Papers 281, Directorate General Economic and Monetary Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
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