We explore an economy with two regions and independent local administrations. Local governments collect taxes to finance public education, but once educated agents can choose to migrate to the other region. The Nash equilibrium of the long-run game between the two governments is compared to a golden rule-type social optimum. Preliminary results show that the Nash equilibrium will result in over- or under-investment depending on the extent to which public education is subject to congestion.
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Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number
2004-43.
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