Fiscal Competition And Public Education In Regions
AbstractWe explore an economy with two regions and independent local administrations. Local governments collect taxes to finance public education, but once educated agents can choose to migrate to the other region. The Nash equilibrium of the long-run game between the two governments is compared to a golden rule-type social optimum. Preliminary results show that the Nash equilibrium will result in over- or under-investment depending on the extent to which public education is subject to congestion.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number 2004-43.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2004
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published by Ivie
Successive generations; Public education; Federal and local government; Fiscal games.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E13 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Neoclassical
- O41 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models
- I29 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Other
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-02-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-DGE-2006-02-19 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-EDU-2006-02-19 (Education)
- NEP-GEO-2006-02-19 (Economic Geography)
- NEP-MAC-2006-02-19 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-2006-02-19 (Public Economics)
- NEP-URE-2006-02-19 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Robin W. Boadway & Frank R. Flatters, 1982. "Efficiency and Equalization Payments in a Federal System of Government: A Synthesis and Extension of Recent Results," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 15(4), pages 613-33, November.
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