- Lobby Groups And The Financial Support Of Election Campaigns

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

- Lobby Groups And The Financial Support Of Election Campaigns

Author Info

M. Socorro Puy (Universidad de Málaga)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

M. Socorro Puy

Abstract

We study a model of competition between two political parties with policy compromise. There is aspecial interest group with well-defined preferences on political issues. Voters are of two kinds:impressionable and knowledgeable. The impressionable voters are influenced by the electioncampaigns. The objective of the parties is to obtain the maximum votes. Parties compete forfinancial support from a given interest group. Each party proposes a plataform in exchange for anamount of campaign funds, and the interest group decides whether to accept or reject each ofcampaign funds, and the interest group decides whether to accept or reject each of theseproposals. We show that parties competition resembles, to a certain extent, Bertrandcompetition. Furthermore, in equilibrium only one party gets funds from interest group. This resultdiffers from the one obtained in a similar model by Grossman and Helpman (1996a) (1996b), inwhich, in equlibrium, both parties are financed by the interest group. This differnce asisesbecause Grossman and Helpman assume that it is the interest group who makes the proposalsto the political parties.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number 1999-18.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Nov 1999
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published by Ivie
Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1999-18

Contact details of provider:
Postal: C/ Guardia Civil, 22, Esc 2a, 1o, E-46020 VALENCIA
Phone: +34 96 319 00 50
Fax: +34 96 319 00 55
Email:
Web page: http://www.ivie.es/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Departamento de Edición).

Other versions of this item:

Article
- Puy, M Socorro, 2000. " Lobby Groups and the Financial Support of Election Campaigns," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 2(3), pages 319-48. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey., 1987. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," Working Papers 643, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Langbein, Laura I, 1993. " PACs, Lobbies and Political Conflict: The Case of Gun Control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(3), pages 551-72, November.
Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Citation analysis on IDEAS includes online papers that are freely accessible and whose text could be automatically analyzed, currently about 210000 papers.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-11.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.