Optimal Search Auctions with Correlated Bidder Types
AbstractWe study optimal auctions when contacting prospective bidders is costly and the biddersï¾’ values are correlated. Although full surplus extraction is in general impossible, we can construct a search mechanism that fully extracts the surplus with an arbitrarily high probability.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Iowa State University, Department of Economics in its series Staff General Research Papers with number 12663.
Date of creation: 01 Oct 2006
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Economics Letters, October 2006, vol. 93 no. 1, pp. 94-100
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Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070
Phone: +1 515.294.6741
Fax: +1 515.294.0221
Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
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Other versions of this item:
- Cremer, Jacques & Spiegel, Yossi & Zheng, Charles Z., 2006. "Optimal search auctions with correlated bidder types," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 94-100, October.
- NEP-ALL-2006-09-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-FMK-2006-09-03 (Financial Markets)
- NEP-GTH-2006-09-03 (Game Theory)
- NEP-KNM-2006-09-03 (Knowledge Management & Knowledge Economy)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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