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Testing the Reliability of FERC's Wholesale Power Market Platform: An Agent-Based Computational Economics Approach

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  • Koesrindartoto, Deddy P.
  • Tesfatsion, Leigh

Abstract

In April 2003 the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) proposed the Wholesale Power Market Platform (WPMP) for common adoption by U.S. wholesale power markets. The WPMP is a complicated market design that has been adopted in some regions of the U.S. but resisted in others on the grounds that its reliability has not yet been sufficiently tested. This article reports on the development of an agent-based computational framework for exploring the economic reliability of the WPMP. The key issue under study is the extent to which the WPMP is capable of sustaining efficient, orderly, and fair market outcomes over time despite attempts by market participants to gain advantage through strategic pricing, capacity withholding, and/or induced transmission congestion. Related work can be accessed at: http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/AMESMarketHome.htm

Suggested Citation

  • Koesrindartoto, Deddy P. & Tesfatsion, Leigh, 2004. "Testing the Reliability of FERC's Wholesale Power Market Platform: An Agent-Based Computational Economics Approach," Staff General Research Papers Archive 12326, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:12326
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    File URL: http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/usaeetalk.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Severin Borenstein, 2002. "The Trouble With Electricity Markets: Understanding California's Restructuring Disaster," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 191-211, Winter.
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    1. Koesrinartoto, D. & Sun, Junjie & Tesfatsion, Leigh, 2005. "An agent-based computational laboratory for testing the economic reliability of wholesale power market designs," ISU General Staff Papers 200501010800001043, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    2. Sun, Junjie & Tesfatsion, Leigh, 2006. "DC Optimal Power Flow Formulation and Solution Using QuadProgJ," Working Papers 18221, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    3. Markose, Sheri & Alentorn, Amadeo & Koesrindartoto, Deddy & Allen, Peter & Blythe, Phil & Grosso, Sergio, 2007. "A smart market for passenger road transport (SMPRT) congestion: An application of computational mechanism design," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 2001-2032, June.
    4. Sensfuß, Frank & Ragwitz, Mario & Genoese, Massimo & Möst, Dominik, 2007. "Agent-based simulation of electricity markets: a literature review," Working Papers "Sustainability and Innovation" S5/2007, Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research (ISI).
    5. Weidlich, Anke & Veit, Daniel, 2008. "A critical survey of agent-based wholesale electricity market models," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 1728-1759, July.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • Q4 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy

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