Cost Arrangement and Welfare in a Multi-Product Cournot Oligopoly
AbstractWelfare in a two-product Cournot oligopoly is shown to increase (decrease) with an increase in correlation between unit costs when the outputs complement (substitute) in demand. A more qualified correlation structure is required for the result to apply in a three-product Cournot oligopoly when products complement in demand.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Iowa State University, Department of Economics in its series Staff General Research Papers with number 12207.
Date of creation: 23 Oct 2004
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complementarity; arrangement increasing; invariance;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
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