Misleading Advertising in Duopoly
AbstractIn this paper, we build a model of strategic misleading advertising in duopolistic markets with horizontal product differentiation and advertising externality between firms. We investigate the effects of regulating misinformation on market competition, behavior of firms, and social welfare. We show that the degree of advertising externality and the magnitude of advertising costs are crucial for determining the welfare effects of several regulations, including prohibiting misleading advertising, educating consumers, taxing production, and taxing misleading advertising. We then extend the model by introducing two types of heterogeneities; heterogeneous consumers and heterogeneous production costs between firms.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number 69.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2011
Date of revision: Mar 2011
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Misleading Advertising; Regulation; Duopoly; Product Differentiation; Advertising Externality;
Other versions of this item:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- M37 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Advertising
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-03-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2011-03-12 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2011-03-12 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2011-03-12 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MKT-2011-03-12 (Marketing)
- NEP-REG-2011-03-12 (Regulation)
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Matsumura, Toshihiro & Sunada, Takeaki, 2013. "Advertising competition in a mixed oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(2), pages 183-185.
- Ursino, Giovanni & Piccolo, Salvatore & Tedeschi, Piero, 2012.
"Deceptive advertising with rational buyers,"
42553, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Keisuke Hattori & Keisaku Higashida, 2011. "When Government Misleads US: Sending Misinformation as Protectionist Devices," Discussion Paper Series 75, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Aug 2011.
- Keisuke Hattori & Keisaku Higashida, 2012. "Who Benefits from Misleading Advertising?," Discussion Paper Series 85, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Mar 2012.
- Keisuke Hattori & Keisaku Higashida, 2011. "Misleading Advertising and Minimum Quality Standards," Discussion Paper Series 74, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Aug 2011.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Toshihiro Okada).
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