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Citizens’ Freedom to Choose Representatives: Ballot Structure, Proportionality and “Fragmented” Parliaments

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Author Info
Paulo Trigo Pereira
João Andrade e Silva

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Abstract

The analysis of the political consequences of electoral laws has emphasized how individual characteristics of the electoral system (electoral formulas, district magnitude, ballot structure) affect the degree of parliament “fragmentation” and proportionality. This paper argues that the personal attributes of representatives are also an important consequence of electoral laws, and that they are in part determined by citizens’ freedom to choose representatives. We clarify this concept and develop an index of citizens’ freedom to choose members of parliament as a function of the ballot structure, district size and electoral formulae. Using data from twenty nine countries, we find that neither proportionality nor the effective number of parties is significantly affected by voters’ freedom of choice. This result has important normative implications for electoral reform.

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File URL: http://pascal.iseg.utl.pt/~depeco/wp/wp132007.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics at the School of Economics and Management (ISEG), Technical University of Lisbon. in its series Working Papers with number 2007/13.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:ise:isegwp:wp132007

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Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management (ISEG), Technical University of Lisbon, Rua do Quelhas 6, 1200-781 LISBON, PORTUGAL
Web page: http://www.iseg.utl.pt/departamentos/economia/

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Related research
Keywords: Ballot structure Electoral index Freedom to choose Personal vote.

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Carles Boix, 1999. "Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies," Economics Working Papers 367, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-7-2.


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