We consider cities which can increase the income of landowners or of capital owners by improving the quality of public services. The improvement can come from innovation or from imitation. We find that when cities aim to benefit landowners, too many cities innovate; but too few cities innovate when the city aims to benefit capital owners. Redistribution across cities can ameliorate these inefficiencies.
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Paper provided by University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
070807.
Find related papers by JEL classification: R13 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - General Equilibrium and Welfare Economic Analysis of Regional Economies H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
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Epple, Dennis & Nechyba, Thomas, 2004.
"Fiscal decentralization,"
Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics,
in: J. V. Henderson & J. F. Thisse (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 55, pages 2423-2480
Elsevier.
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