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Mecanismos de Subasta para la Protección Ambiental y de Otros Recursos Comunes

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  • Juan-Pablo Montero

    ()
    (Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.)

Abstract

Una de las dificultades que enfrentan las autoridades regulatorias en el diseño de políticas eficientes para la protección y preservación de recursos comunes (v.gr., calidad del aire, calidad del agua, cuerpos de agua, pesquerías) es que gran parte de la información relevante para el diseño está en manos privadas. En efecto, los mejor informados respecto de los costos y beneficios asociados al uso de estos recursos son los agentes que los perciben. Este trabajo presenta un mecanismo regulatorio relativamente simple que induce a los agentes involucrados a revelar información privada en forma fidedigna, logrando así, un diseño regulatorio económicamente eficiente. Se trata de una subasta de precio uniforme y sobre cerrado por licencias de uso del recurso (v.gr., permisos de contaminación, derechos de agua, cuotas de pesca) con parte de los ingresos de la subasta devueltos a los agentes participantes. Junto con la discusión teórica-conceptual de las propiedades y funcionamiento del mecanismo de subasta, se presenta una aplicación ilustrativa del mecanismo usando para ello el problema de contaminación de descargas de demanda bioquímica de oxígeno (DBO) en una sección alta del río Bío Bío, ubicado en la zona centro-sur de Chile.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. in its series Documentos de Trabajo with number 340.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Publication status: Published as "Camino al Bicentenario: Propuestas para Chile", Vicerrectoría de Comunicaciones y Asuntos Públicos, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, pp. 111-136, 2007.
Handle: RePEc:ioe:doctra:340

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Related research

Keywords: Externalidades; recursos comunes; subasta de primer precio; información asimétrica;

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  1. Stavins, Robert, 2001. "Experience with Market-Based Environmental Policy Instruments," Discussion Papers dp-01-58, Resources For the Future.
  2. Spulber, Daniel F., 1985. "Effluent regulation and long-run optimality," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 103-116, June.
  3. Dasgupta, Partha & Hammond, Peter & Maskin, Eric, 1980. "On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(5), pages 857-60, October.
  4. Wilson, Robert, 1979. "Auctions of Shares," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 675-89, November.
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