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Weak Aversion to GM Foods: Experimental Evidence from India

Author

Listed:
  • Sangeeta Bansal

    (Centre for International Trade and Development, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi)

  • Sujoy Chakravarty

    (Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi)

  • Bharat Ramaswami

    (Planning Unit, Indian Statistical Institute. New Delhi)

Abstract

The paper makes two important contributions to the literature studying consumer attitudes towards genetically modified foods. First, it elicits willingness- to- pay for similar food products that differ only in their content of GMOs. Second and more importantly, it examines how probabilistic information matters in the formation of food preferences. The paper advances a definition of consumers who are weakly GM averse, i.e., those who do not react to probabilistic information unless it comes in the form of a label. An experiment involving auctions of food products is designed to estimate weak GM aversion on the part of such consumers. In our experiment, about one-fifth of GM averse subjects are weakly averse. Presence of such consumers may have implications for the potential market size for labeled GM foods.

Suggested Citation

  • Sangeeta Bansal & Sujoy Chakravarty & Bharat Ramaswami, "undated". "Weak Aversion to GM Foods: Experimental Evidence from India," Centre for International Trade and Development, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi Discussion Papers 10-02, Centre for International Trade and Development, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.
  • Handle: RePEc:ind:citdwp:10-02
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    File URL: https://www.jnu.ac.in/sites/default/files/DP02_2010.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gruere, Guillaume P., 2006. "A preliminary comparison of the retail level effects of genetically modified food labelling policies in Canada and France," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 148-161, April.
    2. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
    3. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    4. Kirchhoff, Stefanie & Zago, Angelo M., 2001. "A Simple Model Of Voluntary Vs Mandatory Labelling Of Gmos," 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL 20540, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
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    Cited by:

    1. Bansal, Sangeeta & Gruère, Guillaume P., 2012. "Implications of mandatory labeling of GM food in India: Evidence from the supply side," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 467-472.
    2. Mane, Ranjitsinh, 2015. "Acceptance and Use of Genetically Modified Rice in India," Monographs: Applied Economics, AgEcon Search, number 274818, July.

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