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Congress, Treasury, and the Accountability of Exchange Rate Policy: How the 1988 Trade Act Should Be Reformed

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Author Info
C. Randall Henning () (Peterson Institute for International Economics)
Abstract

The controversy within the United States over Chinese exchange rate policy has generated a series of legislative proposals to restrict the discretion of the Treasury Department in determining currency manipulation and to reform the department’s accountability to Congress. This paper reviews Treasury’s reports to Congress on exchange rate policy—introduced by the 1988 Trade Act—and Congress’s treatment of them. It finds that the accountability process has often not worked well in practice: The reports provide only a partial basis for effective congressional oversight. For its part, Congress held hearings on less than half of the reports and overlooked some important substantive issues. Several recommendations can improve guidance to the Treasury, standards for assessment, and congressional oversight. These include (1) refining the criteria used to determine currency manipulation and writing them into law, (2) explicitly harnessing US decisions on manipulation to the International Monetary Fund’s rules on exchange rates, (3) clarifying the general objectives of US exchange rate policy, (4) reaffirming the mandate to seek international macroeconomic and currency cooperation, (5) requiring Treasury to lead an executivewide policy review, and (6) institutionalizing multicommittee oversight of exchange rate policy by Congress. Legislators should strengthen reporting and oversight of broader exchange rate policy in addition to strengthening the provisions targeting manipulation.

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Paper provided by Peterson Institute for International Economics in its series Peterson Institute Working Paper Series with number WP07-08.

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Date of creation: Sep 2007
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Handle: RePEc:iie:wpaper:wp07-8

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Related research
Keywords: Exchange rate policy; currency manipulation; accountability; congressional oversight; China; Treasury; International Monetary Fund;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
F51 - International Economics - - International Relations and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
F53 - International Economics - - International Relations and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Noland, Marcus, 1997. "Chasing Phantoms: The Political Economy of USTR," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 51(3), pages 365-87, Summer.
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  2. Barry Eichengreen, 2004. "Global Imbalances and the Lessons of Bretton Woods," NBER Working Papers 10497, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. C. Randall Henning, 2006. "The External Policy of the Euro Area: Organizing for Foreign Exchange Intervention," Peterson Institute Working Paper Series WP06-04, Peterson Institute for International Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Michael P. Dooley & David Folkerts-Landau & Peter Garber, 2003. "An Essay on the Revived Bretton Woods System," NBER Working Papers 9971, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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