Sorting Out Mechanical and Psychological Effects in Candidate Elections: An Appraisal with Experimental Data
AbstractThe paper proposes a way to measure mechanical and psychological effects of majority runoff versus plurality electoral systems in candidate elections. Building on a series of laboratory experiments, we evaluate these effects with respect to the probability of electing a Condorcet winner candidate. In our experiment, the runoff system very slightly favours the Condorcet winner candidate, but this total effect is small. We show that this is the case because the mechanical and psychological effects tend to cancel each other out. Compared to plurality, the mechanical effect of runoffs is to systematically advantage the Condorcet winner candidate, as usually assumed; but our study detects an opposite psychological effect, to the disadvantage of this candidate.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse in its series IDEI Working Papers with number 711.
Date of creation: Apr 2012
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Other versions of this item:
- Blais, André & Laslier, Jean-François & Sauger, Nicolas & Van Der Straeten, Karine, 2012. "Sorting Out Mechanical and Psychological Effects in Candidate Elections: An Appraisal with Experimental Data," TSE Working Papers 12-296, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- NEP-ALL-2012-05-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2012-05-08 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CDM-2012-05-08 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2012-05-08 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-POL-2012-05-08 (Positive Political Economics)
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- Blais, André & Laslier, Jean-François & Sauger, Nicolas & Van Der Straeten, Karine, 2009.
"Strategic, Sincere and Heuristic Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study,"
IDEI Working Papers
559, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Karine Van der Straeten & Jean-François Laslier & Nicolas Sauger & André Blais, 2010. "Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 435-472, September.
- Blais, André & Laslier, Jean-François & Sauger, Nicolas & Van Der Straeten, Karine, 2009. "Strategic, Sincere and Heuristic Voting under Four Election Rules: An Experimental Study," TSE Working Papers 09-065, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Laurent Bouton & Gabriele Gratton, 2013.
"Majority Runoff Elections: Strategic Voting and Duverger's Hypothesis,"
2013-23, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Bouton, Laurent & Gratton, Gabriele, 0. "Majority runoff elections: strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
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