Redistributional Preferences and Imposed Institutions

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Redistributional Preferences and Imposed Institutions

Author Info

Alberto Chong ()
Mark Gradstein

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Alberto Chong

Abstract

To what extent do imposed institutions shape preferences? We consider this issue by comparing the market-versus-state attitudes of respondents from a capitalist country, Finland, and an ex-communist group of Baltic countries, and by arguing that the period of communist rule can be viewed as an experiment in institutional imposition. We find that, consistent with some earlier related work, citizens from ex-communist countries tend to be more supportive of state ownership than respondents from capitalist economies. However, they also favor increasing inequality and competition as the means to enhance incentives. We conclude that, in some important relevant dimensions, institutional imposition (which lasted for about 50 years) had a limited effect on preferences. The lessons for Latin America are straightforward.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department in its series RES Working Papers with number 4482.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Oct 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4482

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1300 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20577
Phone: 202-623-1000
Email:
Web page: http://www.iadb.org/res
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Luis Daniel Martinez).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Dani Rodrik, 2000. "Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They are and How to Acquire Them," NBER Working Papers 7540, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Rodrik, Dani, 2000. "Institutions For High-Quality Growth: What They Are And How To Acquire Them," CEPR Discussion Papers 2370, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacCulloch, 2007. "Why Doesn't Capitalism Flow to Poor Countries?," NBER Working Papers 13164, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacCulloch, 2004. "Why doesn't Capitalism flow to Poor Countries?," Others 0404005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Luigi Guiso & Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, 2006. "Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(2), pages 23-48, Spring.
Other versions:
- Guiso, Luigi & Sapienza, Paola & Zingales, Luigi, 2006. "Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5505, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales & Luigi Guiso, 2006. "Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?," NBER Working Papers 11999, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Berkowitz, Daniel & Pistor, Katharina & Richard, Jean-Francois, 2003. "Economic development, legality, and the transplant effect," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 165-195, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Daniel Berkowitz & Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, 2000. "Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect," CID Working Papers 39, Center for International Development at Harvard University. [Downloadable!]
- Daniel Berkowitz & Karina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, 2001. "Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 410, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
- Daniel Berkowitz & Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, 2000. "Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 308, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
Ravallion, Martin & Lokshin, Michael, 2000. "Who wants to redistribute?: The tunnel effect in 1990s Russia," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 87-104, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bruno Biais & Enrico Perotti, 2002. "Machiavellian Privatization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 240-258, March. [Downloadable!]
Robert J. Shiller & Maxim Boycko & Vladimir Korobov, 1992. "Hunting for Homo Sovieticus: Situational versus Attitudinal Factors in Economic Behavior," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 23(1992-1), pages 127-194. [Downloadable!]
Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-27, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Andrei Shleifer & Daniel Treisman, 2005. "A Normal Country: Russia after Communism," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 151-174, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kenneth L. Sokoloff & Stanley L. Engerman, 2000. "Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 217-232, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Corneo, Giacomo & Gruner, Hans Peter, 2002. "Individual preferences for political redistribution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 83-107, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Beck, Thorsten & Laeven, Luc, 2005. "Institution building and growth in transition economies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3657, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Beck, Thorsten & Laeven, Luc, 2006. "Institution Building and Growth in Transition Economies," CEPR Discussion Papers 5718, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "Law and Finance," NBER Working Papers 5661, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "Law and Finance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1768, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
Rajan, Raghuram G & Zingales, Luigi, 2006. "The Persistence of Underdevelopment: Institutions, Human Capital or Constituencies," CEPR Discussion Papers 5867, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Raghuram G. Rajan, 2006. "The Persistence of Underdevelopment:Institutions, Human Capital or Constituencies?," Working Papers id:447, esocialsciences.com. [Downloadable!]
Daron Acemoglu, 2006. "Modeling Inefficient Institutions," NBER Working Papers 11940, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Alesina, Alberto & La Ferrara, Eliana, 2005. "Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(5-6), pages 897-931, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, 2001. "Preferences for Redistribution in the Land of Opportunities," NBER Working Papers 8267, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Alesina, Alberto F & La Ferrara, Eliana, 2002. "Preferences for Redistribution in the Land of Opportunities," CEPR Discussion Papers 3155, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, . "Preferences for Redistribution in the Land of Opportunities," Working Papers 178, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
- Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, 2001. "Preferences for Redistribution in the Land of Opportunities," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1936, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Robert J. Shiller & Maxim Boycko & Vladimir Korobov, 1991. "Popular Attitudes Towards Free Markets: The Soviet Union and the United States Compared," NBER Working Papers 3453, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Robert J. Shiller & Maxim Boycko & Vladimir Korobov, 1990. "Popular Attitudes Towards Free Markets: The Soviet Union and the United States Compared," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 952, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
- Shiller, Robert J & Boycko, Maxim & Korobov, Vladimir, 1991. "Popular Attitudes toward Free Markets: The Soviet Union and the United States Compared," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 385-400, June.

Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc stands for Research Papers in Economics.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-10.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.