Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Repercusiones electorales del Consenso de Washington

Contents:

Author Info

  • Eduardo Lora

    ()

  • Mauricio Olivera

Abstract

(Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) En este trabajo se evalúa la manera en que los resultados electorales tanto en comicios presidenciales como legislativos en América Latina se han visto afectados por la adopción de políticas económicas concebidas para mejorar la estabilidad macroeconómica y facilitar el funcionamiento de los mercados. La base de datos incluye 17 países latinoamericanos durante el período 1985-2002, y un total de 66 elecciones presidenciales y 81 legislativas. El conjunto de hipótesis que se pueden poner a prueba proviene de un repaso de la obra publicada y se estructura alrededor de la hipótesis de la economía del voto. Se descubre que (i) se recompensa al partido oficialista si se produce una baja de la inflación y, en menor medida, si aumenta la tasa de crecimiento; (ii) mientras más fragmentado o ideológicamente polarizado sea el sistema partidista, mayores serán las recompensas electorales que genere una reducción de la inflación o un aumento del crecimiento económico, (iii) los electores se interesan no sólo por los resultados económicos, sino también por algunas de las políticas adoptadas: aunque el electorado parece no tomar en cuenta cuestiones macroeconómicas tales como las políticas fiscales o cambiarias, es contrario a las políticas favorables al mercado, independientemente de los efectos que éstas puedan tener en el crecimiento o la inflación, y (iv) el electorado es más tolerante de las reformas a favor del mercado cuando el partido oficialista tiene una ideología más orientada al mercado. Estos resultados sugieren que a los partidos reformistas les ha salido caro adoptar reformas de mercado, salvo en aquellos casos en que las mismas se hayan acometido conjuntamente con políticas de estabilización en economías altamente inflacionarias.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.iadb.org/research/pub_hits.cfm?pub_id=WP-530&pub_file_name=pubWP-530.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department in its series Research Department Publications with number 4406.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: May 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4406

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1300 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20577
Phone: 202-623-1000
Email:
Web page: http://www.iadb.org/res
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Tversky, Amos & Kahneman, Daniel, 1991. "Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(4), pages 1039-61, November.
  2. Eduardo Lora & Ugo Panizza & Myriam Quispe-Agnoli, 2004. "Reform fatigue: symptoms, reasons, and implications," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Q 2, pages 1 - 28.
  3. Thaler, Richard H, et al, 1997. "The Effect of Myopia and Loss Aversion on Risk Taking: An Experimental Test," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(2), pages 647-61, May.
  4. Cukierman, A., 1997. "When Does it Take A Nixon To Go To China?," Discussion Paper 1997-91, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  5. Eduardo Lora, 2001. "Structural Reforms in Latin America: What Has Been Reformed and How to Measure It," IDB Publications 39858, Inter-American Development Bank.
  6. Rafael Di Tella & Robert MacCulloch, 2007. "Why Doesn't Capitalism Flow to Poor Countries?," NBER Working Papers 13164, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7656, David K. Levine.
  8. Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, . "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," Working Papers 100, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  9. Alesina, Alberto & Londregan, John, 1993. "A Model of the Political Economy of the United States," Scholarly Articles 4552529, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  10. Sanjay Jain & Sharun W. Mukand, 2003. "Redistributive Promises and the Adoption of Economic Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 256-264, March.
  11. Sergio Pernice & Federico Sturzenegger, 2004. "Culture and social resistance to reform: a theory about the endogeneity of public beliefs with an application to the case of Argentina," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 275, Universidad del CEMA.
  12. Wolfers, Justin, 2002. "Are Voters Rational? Evidence from Gubernatorial Elections," Research Papers 1730, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  13. Deininger, Klaus & Squire, Lyn, 1998. "New ways of looking at old issues: inequality and growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 259-287.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4406. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Monica Bazan).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.