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Australian Loan Council: Arrangements and Experience with Bailouts

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  • Bhajan S. Grewal
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    Abstract

    In most countries, public borrowing by subnational governments is subjected to somerestrictions imposed by the national governments. In a recent study of 53 selectedcountries, researchers at the International Monetary Fund found that all but six countriesimposed such restrictions. 1 Public borrowing by subnational governments was altogetherprohibited in 16 countries, while 19 countries did not allow subnational governments toborrow overseas. The controls in the remaining countries vary in detail and have beenclassified by the authors of the IMF study into the broad categories of administrativecontrols, rule-based controls and cooperative controls.

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    File URL: http://www.iadb.org/research/pub_hits.cfm?pub_id=R-397&pub_file_name=pubR-397.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department in its series Research Department Publications with number 3098.

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    Date of creation: Nov 2000
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    Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:3098

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    1. Yingyi Qian & Gerard Roland, . "Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint," Working Papers 97045, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
    2. Wildasin, D.E., 1987. "Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition," CORE Discussion Papers 1987020, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. J. Bradford DeLong, 1998. "Fiscal Policy in the Shadow of the Great Depression," NBER Chapters, in: The Defining Moment: The Great Depression and the American Economy in the Twentieth Century, pages 67-86 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1996. "China's transition to markets: market-preserving federalism, chinese style," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 1(2), pages 149-185.
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    Cited by:
    1. Roberto Fernández Llera & Carlos Monasterio Escudero, 2010. "¿Entre dos o entre todos? Examen y propuestas para la coordinación presupuestaria en España," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 195(4), pages 139-163, december.

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