Do Patents Shield Disclosure or Assure Exclusivity When Transacting Technology?
AbstractPatents may assist trade in technology either by protecting buyers against the expropriation of the idea by third parties (the appropriation effect) or by enabling sellers to more frankly disclose the idea during the negotiation phase (the disclosure effect). We test for the presence of both these effects using quasi-experimental matching analysis on a novel dataset of 860 technology transaction negotiations. We identify the appropriation effect by comparing the probability of successful negotiations involving a granted patent with those involving a pending patent. Similarly, we identify the disclosure effect by comparing the probability of successful negotiations involving a pending patent with those involving no patent. We find evidence for the appropriation but not the disclosure effect: technology transaction negotiations involving a granted patent instead of a pending patent are 10 per cent more likely to be successfully completed (compared with an average completion rate of approximately 80 per cent).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne in its series Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series with number wp2013n05.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2013
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
Markets for technology; R&D; invention; patent; intellectual property; appropriability;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property Rights
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-03-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CWA-2013-03-16 (Central & Western Asia)
- NEP-IND-2013-03-16 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-INO-2013-03-16 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2013-03-16 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-TID-2013-03-16 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
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