Corruption, Productivity and Transition
AbstractThe level of productivity is correlated across countries with measures of (lack of) corruption, but this appears to be due to a common association of these variables with measures of social infrastructure, here measured by a combination of governance indexes labelled "rule of law" and "government effectiveness". Econometric use of instruments establishes that causation runs from social infrastructure to productivity. Socialism has had a positive direct effect on productivity but one that is dominated by a negative indirect effect via social infrastructure.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University in its series CERT Discussion Papers with number 0205.
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
corruption; governance; productivity; social infrastructure; transition;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
- O11 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
- P20 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-11-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2002-11-18 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DEV-2002-11-18 (Development)
- NEP-PBE-2002-11-18 (Public Economics)
- NEP-TRA-2002-11-18 (Transition Economics)
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