Encouraging a Coalition Formation
AbstractA 4-person quota game is analyzed and discussed, in which players find it beneficial to pay others, in order to encourage favorable coalition structure.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem in its series Discussion Paper Series with number dp392.
Length: 11 pages
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
game theory; cooperative games; power of a coalition; coalition formations; experiments in game theory;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-07-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2005-07-03 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2005-07-03 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Maschler, M. & Potters, J.A.M. & Tijs, S.H., 1992. "The general nucleolus and the reduced game property," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154217, Tilburg University.
- Potters, J.A.M. & Tijs, S.H., 1992. "The nucleolus of a matrix game and other nucleoli," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154220, Tilburg University.
- Maschler, M & Potters, J A M & Tijs, S H, 1992. "The General Nucleolus and the Reduced Game Property," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 85-106.
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