Declining Valuations in Sequential Auctions

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Declining Valuations in Sequential Auctions

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Thomas Kittsteiner ()
Jorg Nikutta
Eyal Winter

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Abstract

We analyze an independent private values model where a number of objects are sold in sequential first- and second-price auctions. Bidders have unit demand and their valuation for an object is decreasing in the rank number of the auction in which it is sold. We derive efficient equilibria if prices are announced after each auction or if no information is given to bidders. We show that the sequence of prices constitutes a supermartingale. Even if we correct for the decrease in valuations for objects sold in later auctions we find that average prices are declining.

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Paper provided by Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem in its series Discussion Paper Series with number dp385.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp385

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Article
- Thomas Kittsteiner & Jörg Nikutta & Eyal Winter, 2004. "Declining valuations in sequential auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 89-106, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2005-07-03 (All new papers)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Said, Maher, 2008. "Information Revelation in Sequential Ascending Auctions," MPRA Paper 7160, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 07 Oct 2008. [Downloadable!]
Paul Schweinzer, 2006. "Labour market screening with intermediaries," Discussion Papers 138, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
Paul Schweinzer, 2008. "Labour market recruiting with intermediaries," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 119-127, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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