IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hoo/wpaper/14101.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Financial Market Infrastructure: Too Important to Fail

Author

Listed:
  • Darrell Duffie

Abstract

This paper argues that failure resolution cannot yet be safely applied to certain firms that operate key financial market infrastructures used for clearing over-the-counter derivatives or tri-party repurchase agreements.

Suggested Citation

  • Darrell Duffie, 2014. "Financial Market Infrastructure: Too Important to Fail," Economics Working Papers 14101, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
    • Handle: RePEc:hoo:wpaper:14101
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/14101_-_duffie_-_financial_market_infrastructure_-_too_important_to_fail.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Elliott, David, 2013. "Financial Stability Paper No 20: Central counterparty loss-allocation rules," Bank of England Financial Stability Papers 20, Bank of England.
    2. William Dudley, 2012. "Reforming the OTC derivatives market," Speech 77, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sylvain Benoit & Jean-Edouard Colliard & Christophe Hurlin & Christophe Pérignon, 2017. "Where the Risks Lie: A Survey on Systemic Risk," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(1), pages 109-152.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Wenqian Huang, 2019. "Central counterparty capitalization and misaligned incentives," BIS Working Papers 767, Bank for International Settlements.
    2. Boissel, Charles & Derrien, François & Ors, Evren & Thesmar, David, 2017. "Systemic risk in clearing houses: Evidence from the European repo market," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(3), pages 511-536.
    3. Ms. Froukelien Wendt, 2015. "Central Counterparties: Addressing their Too Important to Fail Nature," IMF Working Papers 2015/021, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Berndsen, Ron J. & León, Carlos & Renneboog, Luc, 2018. "Financial stability in networks of financial institutions and market infrastructures," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 120-135.
    5. Christian Kubitza & Loriana Pelizzon & Mila Getmansky Sherman, 2021. "Loss Sharing in Central Clearinghouses: Winners and Losers," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 066, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    6. Rehlon, Amandeep & Nixon, Dan, 2013. "Central counterparties: what are they, why do they matter and how does the Bank supervise them?," Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of England, vol. 53(2), pages 147-156.
    7. Gabrielle Demange & Thibaut Piquard, 2021. "On the market structure of central counterparties in the EU," Working Papers halshs-03107812, HAL.
    8. Vincent Bignon & Guillaume Vuillemey, 2020. "The Failure of a Clearinghouse: Empirical Evidence [Counterparty risk externality: centralized versus over-the-counter markets]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 24(1), pages 99-128.
    9. Kubitza, Christian & Pelizzon, Loriana & Getmansky, Mila, 2018. "The pitfalls of central clearing in the presence of systematic risk," ICIR Working Paper Series 31/18, Goethe University Frankfurt, International Center for Insurance Regulation (ICIR).
    10. Radoslav Raykov, 2016. "To Share or Not to Share? Uncovered Losses in a Derivatives Clearinghouse," Staff Working Papers 16-4, Bank of Canada.
    11. Demange, Gabrielle & Piquard, Thibaut, 2023. "On the choice of central counterparties in the EU," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    12. Lannoo, Karel, 2017. "Derivatives Clearing and Brexit: A comment on the proposed EMIR revisions," ECMI Papers 13150, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    13. Francesco Palazzo, 2016. "Peer monitoring via loss mutualization," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1088, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    14. Andrew W Lo, 2016. "Moore's Law vs. Murphy's Law in the financial system: who's winning?," BIS Working Papers 564, Bank for International Settlements.
    15. Gaetano Antinolfi & Francesca Carapella & Francesco Carli, 2019. "Transparency and Collateral: The Design of CCPs' Loss Allocation Rules," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2019-058, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    16. Alexandra Heath & Gerard Kelly & Mark Manning, 2015. "Central Counterparty Loss Allocation and Transmission of Financial Stress," RBA Research Discussion Papers rdp2015-02, Reserve Bank of Australia.
    17. Nahai-Williamson, Paul & Ota, Tomohiro & Vital, Mathieu & Wetherilt, Anne, 2013. "Financial Stability Paper No 19: Central counterparties and their financial resources – a numerical approach," Bank of England Financial Stability Papers 19, Bank of England.
    18. Cumming, Fergus & Noss, Joseph, 2013. "Financial Stability Paper No 26: Assessing the adequacy of CCPs' default resources," Bank of England Financial Stability Papers 26, Bank of England.
    19. Matt Gibson, 2013. "Recovery and Resolution of Central Counterparties," RBA Bulletin (Print copy discontinued), Reserve Bank of Australia, pages 39-48, December.
    20. Rahman, Arshadur, 2015. "Over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, central clearing and financial stability," Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of England, vol. 55(3), pages 283-294.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hoo:wpaper:14101. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Webmaster (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/hostaus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.