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Central counterparties: what are they, why do they matter and how does the Bank supervise them?

Author

Listed:
  • Rehlon, Amandeep

    (Bank of England)

  • Nixon, Dan

    (Bank of England)

Abstract

The Government introduced major changes to the system of financial regulation in the United Kingdom in April 2013, including creating the Financial Policy Committee and transferring significant new supervisory responsibilities to the Bank. As part of this, the Bank is now responsible for the supervision of central counterparties, or CCPs. This article explains what CCPs are, setting out their importance for the financial system — including the benefits they bring and some of the risks they could present if not properly managed. It also summarises the Bank’s approach to supervising CCPs and describes some of the key priorities the Bank will be pursuing.

Suggested Citation

  • Rehlon, Amandeep & Nixon, Dan, 2013. "Central counterparties: what are they, why do they matter and how does the Bank supervise them?," Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of England, vol. 53(2), pages 147-156.
    • Handle: RePEc:boe:qbullt:0106
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Elliott, David, 2013. "Financial Stability Paper No 20: Central counterparty loss-allocation rules," Bank of England Financial Stability Papers 20, Bank of England.
    2. Murphy, Emma & Senior, Stephen, 2013. "Changes to the Bank of England," Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of England, vol. 53(1), pages 20-28.
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    Cited by:

    1. Balluck, Kushal, 2015. "Investment banking: linkages to the real economy and the financial system," Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of England, vol. 55(1), pages 4-22.
    2. Ivana Ruffini, 2015. "Central Clearing: Risks and Customer Protections," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Q IV, pages 90-100.
    3. Huszár, Zsuzsa R. & Prado, Melissa Porras, 2019. "An analysis of over-the-counter and centralized stock lending markets," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 31-53.
    4. Jin-Wook Chang, 2019. "Collateralized Debt Networks with Lender Default," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2019-083, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    5. Manning, Stuart, 2014. "The Bank of England as a bank," Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of England, vol. 54(2), pages 129-136.
    6. Davey, Nick & Gray, Daniel, 2014. "How has the Liquidity Saving Mechanism reduced banks’ intraday liquidity costs in CHAPS?," Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of England, vol. 54(2), pages 180-189.
    7. Martin D. Gould & Nikolaus Hautsch & Sam D. Howison & Mason A. Porter, 2020. "Counterparty Credit Limits: The Impact of a Risk-Mitigation Measure on Everyday Trading," Applied Mathematical Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(6), pages 520-548, November.
    8. Boudiaf, Ismael Alexander & Scheicher, Martin & Vacirca, Francesco, 2023. "CCP initial margin models in Europe," Occasional Paper Series 314, European Central Bank.
    9. Matt Gibson, 2013. "Recovery and Resolution of Central Counterparties," RBA Bulletin (Print copy discontinued), Reserve Bank of Australia, pages 39-48, December.
    10. Julliard, Christian & Pinter, Gabor & Todorov, Karamfil & Yuan, Kathy, 2022. "What drives repo haircuts? Evidence from the UK market," Bank of England working papers 985, Bank of England.
    11. Gracie, Andrew & Chennells, Lucy & Menary, Mark, 2014. "The Bank of England’s approach to resolving failed institutions," Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of England, vol. 54(4), pages 409-418.
    12. Burrows, Oliver & Cumming, Fergus, 2015. "Mapping the UK financial system," Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of England, vol. 55(2), pages 114-129.
    13. Rahman, Arshadur, 2015. "Over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, central clearing and financial stability," Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of England, vol. 55(3), pages 283-294.
    14. Tucker, Paul & Hall, Simon & Pattani, Aashish, 2013. "Macroprudential policy at the Bank of England," Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of England, vol. 53(3), pages 192-200.
    15. Ashwin Clarke & Paul Ryan, 2014. "Non-dealer Clearing of Over-the-counter Derivatives," RBA Bulletin (Print copy discontinued), Reserve Bank of Australia, pages 77-88, March.
    16. Gould, Martin D. & Hautsch, Nikolaus & Howison, Sam D. & Porter, Mason A., 2017. "Counterparty credit limits: An effective tool for mitigating counterparty risk?," CFS Working Paper Series 581, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    17. Jonathan Carroll & Ashwin Clarke, 2014. "The Equity Securities Lending Market," RBA Bulletin (Print copy discontinued), Reserve Bank of Australia, pages 31-42, December.
    18. Liu, Zijun & Quiet, Stephanie & Roth , Benedict, 2015. "Banking sector interconnectedness: what is it, how can we measure it and why does it matter?," Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of England, vol. 55(2), pages 130-138.

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