The soft budget constraint syndrome in the hospital sector

Research to date has focused mainly on the soft budget constraint syndrome in the corporate sector and in the credit system. This article concentrates on the hospital sector. It describes the motivations and the contradictory nature of the behaviour of the patient, the physician, the hospital director, the politician and the hospital owner. The motivations explain the reasons behind the strong inclination to overspend and the tendency of softening budgetary limits. The burden of overspending and debt is pushed upward at each level of the decision-making and financing processes. This article covers the relationship between the various ownership types (state, non-profit and for-profit non-state ownership types) and the soft budget constraint syndrome. Finally, it looks at the phenomenon from normative aspects: the favourable and unfavourable consequences of the hardening of the budgetary limit and how normative dilemmas are reflected in the minds of the participants of the events.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)