On Initial Conferment of Individual Rights
AbstractAn extended social choice framework is proposed for the analysis of initial conferment of individual rights. This framework captures the intuitive conception of decision-making procedure as a carrier of intrinsic value along with the instrumental usefulness thereof in realizing valuable culmination outcomes. The model of social decision-making consists of two stages. In the first stage, the society decides on the game-form rights to be promulgated. In the second stage, the promulgated game form rights, coupled with the revealed profile of individual preference orderings over the set of culmination outcomes, determine a fully-fledged game, the play of which determines a culmination outcome at the Nash equilibrium. A set of sufficient conditions for the existence of a social choice procedure, which can choose a game form in the first stage that is not only liberal, but also uniformly applicable to every revealed profile of individual preference orderings over the set of culmination outcomes, is identified.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number a478.
Length: 56 p.
Date of creation: Mar 2006
Date of revision:
Note: This version February 14, 2006
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Extended alternative; Extended constitution function; Uniformly rational choice; Liberal game form; Non-consequentialist evaluation of rightssystem;
Other versions of this item:
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:30:y:2010:i:1:p:103-114 is not listed on IDEAS
- Vincent Martinet & Ngo Van Long, 2012.
"Combining Rights and Welfarism: a new approach to intertemporal evaluation of social alternatives,"
EconomiX Working Papers
2012-14, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
- Ngo Van Long & Vincent Martinet, 2012. "Combining Rights and Welfarism: A New Approach to Intertemporal Evaluation of Social Alternatives," Cahiers de recherche 01-2012, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Ngo Van Long & Vincent Martinet, 2012. "Combining Rights and Welfarism: A New Approach to Intertemporal Evaluation of Social Alternatives," CESifo Working Paper Series 3746, CESifo Group Munich.
- Enrico Guzzini, 2010. "Efficient Nash equilibria, individual rights and Pareto principle: an impossibility result," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(1), pages 103-114.
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