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On Initial Conferment of Individual Rights

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Author Info
Kotaro Suzumura
Naoki Yoshihara

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Abstract

An extended social choice framework is proposed for the analysis of initial conferment of individual rights. This framework captures the intuitive conception of decision-making procedure as a carrier of intrinsic value along with the instrumental usefulness thereof in realizing valuable culmination outcomes. The model of social decision-making consists of two stages. In the first stage, the society decides on the game-form rights to be promulgated. In the second stage, the promulgated game form rights, coupled with the revealed profile of individual preference orderings over the set of culmination outcomes, determine a fully-fledged game, the play of which determines a culmination outcome at the Nash equilibrium. A set of sufficient conditions for the existence of a social choice procedure, which can choose a game form in the first stage that is not only liberal, but also uniformly applicable to every revealed profile of individual preference orderings over the set of culmination outcomes, is identified.

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Paper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number a478.

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Date of creation: Mar 2006
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Handle: RePEc:hit:hituec:a478

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Related research
Keywords: Extended alternative; Extended constitution function; Uniformly rational choice; Liberal game form; Non-consequentialist evaluation of rightssystem;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kotaro Suzumura, 1999. "Consequences, opportunities, and procedures," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 17-40. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Farrell, M J, 1976. "Liberalism in the Theory of Social Choice," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(1), pages 3-10, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Deb, Rajat & Pattanaik, Prasanta K. & Razzolini, Laura, 1997. "Game Forms, Rights, and the Efficiency of Social Outcomes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 74-95, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Sen, Amartya, 1970. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(1), pages 152-57, Jan.-Feb.. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Samet, Dov & Schmeidler, David, 2003. "Between liberalism and democracy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 213-233, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Sen, Amartya K, 1976. "Liberty, Unanimity and Rights," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 43(171), pages 217-45, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Kotaro Suzumura, 1999. "Welfare Economics Beyond Welfarist-Consequentialism," Discussion Paper Series a382, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  8. Bezalel Peleg, 1997. "Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 67-80. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Peleg, Bezalel & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2002. "Nash consistent representation of constitutions: a reaction to the Gibbard paradox," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 267-287, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Osborne, D K, 1975. "On Liberalism and the Pareto Principle," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(6), pages 1283-87, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. North, Douglass C, 1991. "Institutions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 97-112, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Deb, Rajat, 1994. "Waiver, Effectivity and Rights as Game Forms," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 61(242), pages 167-78, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Blau, Julian H, 1975. "Liberal Values and Independence," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(3), pages 395-401, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Gaertner, Wulf & Pattanaik, Prasanta K & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1992. "Individual Rights Revisited," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 59(234), pages 161-77, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Pattanaik, Prasanta K & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1994. "Rights, Welfarism, and Social Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 435-39, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Pattanaik, Prasanta K & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1996. "Individual Rights and Social Evaluation: A Conceptual Framework," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(2), pages 194-212, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  17. Sen, Amartya, 1992. "Minimal Liberty," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 59(234), pages 139-59, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Kotaro Suzumura & Naoki Yoshihara, 2008. "On Initial Conferment of Individual Rights," Discussion Paper Series a502, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
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