What impact does antitrust intervention have on competition? The case of public drug procurement in Russia
AbstractIn this paper we study antitrust intervention in long-term relationships between public procurer and his preferred supplier in one of the Russian regions. We presume that antitrust control of auctions held by affiliated procurer increases the risks of implementing long-term relationships with his preferred supplier. However we found out that after the intervention of antitrust agency the number of bidders in the auctions increased, but relative contract prices remained the same. We argue that procurer and preferred bidder invited firm with passive bidding strategy to decrease the risks of antitrust punishment. Thereby, antitrust intervention led to fake competition, but not to honest non-corrupt behavior in public auctions
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Research University Higher School of Economics in its series HSE Working papers with number WP BRP 32/EC/2013.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in WP BRP Series: Economics / EC, July 2013, pages 1-26
public auctions; antitrust policy; pharmaceuticals; Russia.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-12-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-CIS-2013-12-06 (Confederation of Independent States)
- NEP-COM-2013-12-06 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-TRA-2013-12-06 (Transition Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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