Democracy as a Middle Ground: A Uni…ed Theory of Development and Political Regimes
AbstractA large literature documents that autocratic regimes have not, on average, outperformed democratic regimes, although they do display greater variance in economic performance. At the same time, no long-lived autocracy currently is rich whereas every long-lived democracy is. This paper puts forth a theory to account for these observations. The theory rests on the idea that autocratic leaders are heterogenous in their preferences and the idea that special interest groups can successfully lobby a democratic regime for policies that delay industrialization. We show that an elite landed class chooses to democratize society only after the economy has accumulated enough wealth.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Stockholm University, Department of Economics in its series Research Papers in Economics with number 2010:7.
Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: 27 May 2010
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: +46 8 16 20 00
Fax: +46 8 16 14 25
Web page: http://www.ne.su.se/
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Autocracy; Democracy; Landed Elites; Growth Miracles; Vested Interests;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-06-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-06-04 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EVO-2010-06-04 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-POL-2010-06-04 (Positive Political Economics)
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- Anders Akerman & Anna Larsson & Alireza Naghavi, 2011.
"Autocracies and Development in a Global Economy: A Tale of Two Elites,"
2011.65, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Akerman, Anders & Larsson, Anna & Naghavi, Alireza, 2011. "Autocracies and Development in a Global Economy: A Tale of Two Elites," Research Papers in Economics 2011:24, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
- A. Akerman & A. Larsson & A. Naghavi, 2011. "Autocracies and Development in a Global Economy: A Tale of Two Elites," Working Papers wp775, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Anders Akerman & Anna Larsson & Alireza Naghavi, 2011. "Autocracies and Development in a Global Economy: A Tale of Two Elites," DEGIT Conference Papers c016_041, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
- Anders Akerman & Anna Larsson & Alireza Naghavi, 2011. "Autocracies and Development in a Global Economy: A Tale of Two Elites," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 065, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics.
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