Pure vs. Mutual Sick Insurance Societies. Evidence from Swedish Historical Data
AbstractUsing data from voluntary Swedish sick insurance societies 1902-1910, this paper analyzes the coexistence of pure and mutual insurance societies where pure societies are characterized by charging ex ante premiums only while mutuals in addition charge ex post assessments. Mutual insurance societies are found, on average, to be larger and to offer longer insurance coverage duration. Pure insurance societies have, on average, higher insurance coverage per day, greater mean levels of moral hazard controls, a higher mean number of policy categories and are on average, older.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Stockholm University, Department of Economics in its series Research Papers in Economics with number 2001:10.
Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 10 Sep 2001
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: +46 8 16 20 00
Fax: +46 8 16 14 25
Web page: http://www.ne.su.se/
More information through EDIRC
friendly societies; sick insurance; health insurance;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- N23 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Europe: Pre-1913
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Patricia Born & William M. Gentry & W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 1998.
"Organizational Form and Insurance Company Performance: Stocks versus Mutuals,"
in: The Economics of Property-Casualty Insurance, pages 167-192
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Patricia Born & William M. Gentry & W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 1995. "Organizational Form and Insurance Company Performance: Stocks versus Mutuals," NBER Working Papers 5246, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Goeran Skogh, 1999. "Risk-Sharing Institutions for Unpredictable Losses," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 155(3), pages 505-, September.
- Boozer, Michael A., 1997. "Econometric Analysis of Panel Data Badi H. Baltagi Wiley, 1995," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(05), pages 747-754, October.
- Smith, Bruce D & Stutzer, Michael, 1995. "A Theory of Mutual Formation and Moral Hazard with Evidence from the History of the Insurance Industry," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 8(2), pages 545-77.
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