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The Kyoto agreement and Technology Spillovers

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Author Info
Golombek, Rolf () (The Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research)
Hoel, Michael () (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo)

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Abstract

A significant reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions will require development of new technologies if such reductions are to be achieved without excessive costs. An important question is whether an agreement of the Kyoto type, which does not include elements related to research and development (R&D) of new technologies, will give sufficient incentives to develop such new technologies. On the one hand, since greenhouse gas emissions will become costly for countries and private producers, countries and individual producers will have incentives to undertake effort and costs to develop new technologies. On the other hand, R&D in one country is not only advantageous for this country, but usually also for other countries. The reason for this is that producers in these countries in many cases will learn from the R&D project, for example, through(informal) networks, journals, and in some cases through the import of goods from the country where the new technology is developed. The purpose of the paper is to discuss properties of an international climate agreement of the Kyoto type when R&D investments undertaken in one country are beneficial also for other countries. We examine whether a Kyoto type of agreement can provide the correct social amount of aggregate emissions and R&D investments in new technologies. We argue that the outcome of a Kyoto type agreement will differ from the social optimum. In particular, for a given level of abatement a Kyoto type agreement provides too little R&D investments relative to the social optimum.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number 05/2005.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 06 Apr 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:2005_005

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Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
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Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
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Related research
Keywords: Climate policy; Kyoto; international environmental agreements; R&D; technology spillovers.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
P28 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Natural Resources; Environment
Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Carlo Carraro & Barbara Buchner, 2006. "Economic and Environmental Effectiveness of a Technology-based Climate Protocol," Working Papers 2006_12Classification-JEL, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Spence, Michael, 1984. "Cost Reduction, Competition, and Industry Performance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 101-21, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori, 2003. "Endogenous Strategic Issue Linkage in International Negotiations," Working Papers 2003.40, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  4. Cohen, Wesley M & Levinthal, Daniel A, 1989. "Innovation and Learning: The Two Faces of R&D," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(397), pages 569-96, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Rolf Golombek & Michael Hoel, 2004. "Unilateral Emission Reductions and Cross-Country Technology Spillovers," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(2). [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Geoffrey Heal & Nori Tarui, 2008. "Technology diffusion, abatement cost, and transboundary pollution," Working Papers 200803, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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