Investment and emission control under technology and pollution externalities
AbstractThis paper studies incentives to develop advanced pollution abatement technology when technology may spillover across agents and pollution abatement is a public good. We are motivated by a variety of pollution control issues where solutions require the development and implementation of new pollution abatement technologies. We show that at the Nash equilibrium of a simultaneous-move game with R&D investment and emission abatement, whether the free rider effect prevails and under-investment and excess emissions occur depends on the degree of technology spillovers and the effect of R&D on the marginal abatement costs. There are cases in which, contrary to conventional wisdom, Nash equilibrium investments in emissions reductions exceed the first-best case.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Resource and Energy Economics.
Volume (Year): 32 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505569
International environmental agreement Pollution abatement costs Endogenous technological change;
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