Economic and Environmental Effectiveness of a Technology-based Protocol
AbstractThis Paper provides a first applied game theory analysis of a technology-based climate protocol by assessing: (i) the self-enforcement (namely, the absence of incentives to free ride) of the coalition that would form when countries negotiate on climate-related technological cooperation; (ii) the environmental effectiveness of a technology-based climate protocol. The analysis is carried out using a model in which endogenous and induced technical changes are explicitly modelled and in which international technological spillovers are also quantified. The results of our analysis partly support Barrett’s and Benedick’s conjecture. On the one hand, a self-enforcing agreement is more likely to emerge when countries cooperate on environmental technological innovation and diffusion than when they cooperate on emission abatement. Technological cooperation – without any commitment to emission control – may not lead to a sufficient abatement of greenhouse gas concentrations, however.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 4412.
Date of creation: Jun 2004
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- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
- O30 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - General
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- Carlo Carraro & Barbara Buchner, 2006.
"Regional and sub-global climate blocs. A game-theoretic perspective on bottom-up climate regimes,"
2006_10, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
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- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:17:y:2004:i:7:p:1-11 is not listed on IDEAS
- Alberto Ansuategi & Marta Escapa, 2004. "Is international cooperation on climate change good for the environment?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 17(7), pages 1-11.
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