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Optimal Risk-Sharing and Deductables in Insurance

Author

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  • Aase, Knut K.

    (Dept. of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration)

Abstract

Risk-sharing in insurance is analyzed, with a view towards explaining the prevalence of deductibles. First we introduce, in a modern setting, the main concepts of the theory of risk-sharing in a group of agents. This theory we apply to the risk-sharing problem between an insurer and an insurance customer. We motivate the development through simple examples, illustrating some of the subtle points of this theory. In order to deduce deductibles endogenously, not explained in the neoclassical model, we separately introduce (i) the insurable asset as a decision variable, (ii) administrative costs, and (iii) moral hazard, and illustrate by examples.

Suggested Citation

  • Aase, Knut K., 2006. "Optimal Risk-Sharing and Deductables in Insurance," Discussion Papers 2006/24, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2006_024
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163856
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Knut K. Aase, 2017. "Optimal Insurance Policies in the Presence of Costs," Risks, MDPI, vol. 5(3), pages 1-17, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Reinsurance Exchange; Equilibrium; Pareto Optimality; Representative Agent; Core Solution; Individual Rationality; Deductibles; Costs; Moral Hazard;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies

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