Executive Compensation Based on Asset Values
AbstractThis paper describes how credit default swaps could be employed to create performance based executive compensation portfolios that reflect the value of a firm’s debt as well as equity; i.e. the total value of all a firm’s assets. So-called Asset Value Unit (AVU) compensation portfolios are defined and compared to ordinary (long-term incentive) stock compensation portfolios for a range of banks from the recent EU-wide stress testing exercise conducted by the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS). While our study is limited to bank executives, the suggested method of paying executives using credit default swaps in addition to stocks also works for non-financial firms as well as for non-executives. The empirical results suggest that executive/CEO compensation plans based on asset values behave more reasonably than traditional equity based plans.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Lund University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2010:9.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 14 Aug 2010
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published as Byström, Hans, 'Executive Compensation Based on Asset Values' in Economics Bulletin, 2012, pages 1498-1502.
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund,Sweden
Phone: +46 +46 222 0000
Fax: +46 +46 2224613
Web page: http://www.nek.lu.se/
More information through EDIRC
executive pay; executive compensation; stock; credit default swap; bank; stress test;
Other versions of this item:
- G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-08-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2010-08-21 (Banking)
- NEP-BEC-2010-08-21 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CFN-2010-08-21 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-LAB-2010-08-21 (Labour Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Patrick Bolton & Hamid Mehran & Joel Shapiro, 2010. "Executive compensation and risk taking," Staff Reports 456, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
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